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Abstract
Using computer simulation, we investigate the impact of different strategies on
the financial performance of VCs. We compare simple heuristics such as equal
weighting and fast and frugal trees with more complex machine learning and
regression models and analyze the impact of three factors: VC learning, the
statistical properties of the investment environment, and the amount of infor-
mation available in a business plan. We demonstrate that the performance of
decision strategies and the relative quality of decision outcomes change critically
between environments in which different statistical relationships hold between
information contained in business plans and the likelihood of financial success.
The Equal Weighting strategy is competitive with more complex investment
decision strategies and its performance is robust across environments. Learning
only from those plans that the simulated VC invested in, drastically reduces the
VC’s potential to learn from experience. Lastly, the results confirm that decision
strategies differ in respect to the impact of added information on the outcomes
of decisions. Finally, we discuss real-world implications for the practice of VCs
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1. Introduction
Each year venture capital (VC) funds invest billions of dollars in entrepreneurs
and companies that seek to commercialize their innovative products and ser-
vices. VC-backed companies receive much needed capital as well as privileged
access to financial and commercial networks, so being selected by a VC as a5
portfolio investment is considered by many to be one of the keys to success for in-
novative high growth ventures (Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; Megginson & Weiss,
1991). Yet, only one to three per cent of the hundreds of deals received each
year by any given VC firm are ultimately selected as portfolio investments
(Bruno & Tyebjee, 1985; Maier & Walker, 1987; Petty & Gruber, 2011). Given10
the perceived benefits of receiving VC investment combined with the apparent
selectivity on the part of the VCs, it is little wonder that VC decision making
has prompted multiple streams of research.
The existing research on VC decision making has focused on two main issues,
the overarching selection process (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984; Riquelme & Rickards,15
1992; Fried & Hisrich, 1994) and the criteria used by VCs when evaluating deals
(MacMillan et al., 1985; Dixon, 1991; Hisrich & Jankowicz, 1990; Hall & Hofer,
1993; Muzyka et al., 1996; Franke et al., 2008). Multiple studies have demon-
strated that VCs generally rely upon a multi-stage screening and evaluation
process that is designed to limit information asymmetry while reducing the prob-20
ability of missing a potentially profitable opportunity, thus ultimately maximiz-
ing their profits (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984; Hall & Hofer, 1993; Fried & Hisrich,
1994; Gompers, 1998). In terms of the actual investment decision, research
has repeatedly shown that when forecasting the viability of a deal, its relative
attractiveness is determined by the VC’s assessment of the many associated in-25
formational cues or characteristics (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984; MacMillan et al.,
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1985; Riquelme & Rickards, 1992; Zacharakis & Meyer, 2000). However, al-
though different VCs appear to engage in the same selection process and focus
on the same general categories of cues when evaluating deals, all VCs do not
necessarily employ the same forecasting and decision making strategies when30
assessing the potential profitability of deals and ultimately selecting portfolio
investments (Gupta & Sapienza, 1992; Muzyka et al., 1996; Shepherd, 1999a;
Shepherd & Zacharakis, 2002). Hoffman, one of the pioneering researchers in
the field, concluded that “VCs are likely to differ substantially in their invest-
ment propensity and practices to the same set of investment situations” (1972,35
p.182).
Two research questions central to VC decision making have received only
limited attention in the literature: (1) how do different decision making strate-
gies impact the VC’s overall performance, and (2) what are the factors that
influence how well VCs can learn from outcome feedback. These issues are of40
particular importance in the VC context given the failure rates of new ventures
and the varying rates of returns of VC investment portfolios (Sahlman, 1990;
Mason & Harrison, 2002; Dimov & De Clercq, 2006). The objective of this pa-
per is to estimate the relative effectiveness of different decision making strategies
which may be employed by a VC while at the same time accounting for the im-45
pact of learning when screening and selecting deals over the life of a fund. This
goal is achieved by means of computer simulations in which the relation between
the variables describing a business plan and the success probability of this plan
is systematically manipulated.
2. Related Literature50
A recurring theme in the VC decision making literature over the past forty
years has been the attempt to identify the informational cues that VCs deem to
be relevant when reviewing an investment proposal or a business plan. Specifi-
cally, researchers have endeavored to develop lists or categories of the key cues
and then determine how these cues are used by the VC to evaluate and select, or55
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more commonly reject, an investment proposal (Hoffman, 1972; MacMillan et al.,
1985; Robinson, 1987; Muzyka et al., 1996; Zacharakis & Meyer, 1998; Kaplan & Strömberg,
2004). As a result, a multitude of cues have been recorded and there is general
agreement between researchers that these cues can be grouped within the fol-
lowing broad categories: (a) product characteristics, (b) market characteristics,60
(c) a company’s financial position and outlook, (d) the traits of the entrepreneur
or management team, and (e) other cues such as the interest of another VC in
a business plan under consideration or the ability of a VC to add value to a
deal (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984; Muzyka et al., 1996; Zacharakis & Meyer, 2000;
Petty & Gruber, 2011).65
Regardless of how these cues may be listed or arbitrarily grouped, it is impor-
tant to note that there is no corresponding agreement amongst VCs as to which
of the cues is considered to be the most important when evaluating and select-
ing a deal (Riquelme & Rickards, 1992; Hall & Hofer, 1993; Gompers & Lerner,
1999; Shepherd, 1999b). In reality, the perceived relative significance of any70
given cue is often context specific and may be influenced by the investment
climate, characteristics of the VC firm, or the preferences of the individual VC.
Several experimental studies involving VCs have established that the eval-
uation of a deal is often influenced by idiosyncratic factors such as an indi-
vidual’s intuition, previous industry experience, educational background, or75
investing experience (Hisrich & Jankowicz, 1990; Riquelme & Rickards, 1992;
Zacharakis & Meyer, 2000; Franke et al., 2008). However, despite being con-
sidered experts at selecting high potential deals and spending on average one-
third of their time screening and evaluating deals (Robinson, 1987), there is
little evidence that VCs are aware of their underlying decision making strate-80
gies. To the contrary, as a result of their performance in a variety of study
settings, the ability of VCs to accurately identify successful companies has of-
ten been called into question by researchers (Khan, 1987; Zacharakis & Meyer,
1998; Shepherd et al., 2003; Zacharakis & Shepherd, 2005).
Another area that has received little attention is the role of learning and85
its impact on VC investment decision making and firm performance. The
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few studies that have examined learning within VC firms (Chan et al., 1990;
Bergemann & Hege, 1998; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001) have focused on contract-
ing and portfolio management activities, which take place after the VC has
made their investment decision. Unlike existing research, our study focuses on90
VC learning during the pre-investment phase of the process. Unlike the post-
investment activities that are only performed with the few deals that are selected
as portfolio companies, VCs repeatedly perform the pre-investment screening
routine on each of the thousands of proposals they receive and conduct evalu-
ations on hundreds of deals over the life of any given fund (Tyebjee & Bruno,95
1984; Fried & Hisrich, 1994). Existing views of the VC’s selection and evalu-
ation of the cues that are used when making investment decisions have been
built primarily upon survey and experimental design-based studies. As a result,
the majority of the research in this stream remains cross sectional in design and
only indirectly linked to the VC’s combined objective to both enhance process100
efficiency and maximize the firm’s return on investment (ROI) (Gifford, 1997;
De Clercq & Sapienza, 2005; Shepherd et al., 2005).
Our simulations provide a comparison of the effectiveness of various forecast-
ing and decision making strategies with prescriptive implications for VC decision
making. As Herbert Simon (e.g. 1955) repeatedly asserted, strategies and en-105
vironments have to be considered jointly. Building on this insight, the notion
of ecological rationality (Hogarth & Karelaia, 2007; Todd et al., 2012) implies
that the effectiveness of strategies can only be evaluated in a given context.
We report how well strategies for investment decisions perform in environments
that vary along the following dimensions: (i) selectivity of outcome information110
(information about the success or failure of a business plan is available for all
plans versus only for those plans a VC has invested in), (ii) the relative impor-
tance of cues, and (iii) the number of cues available to the VC. Note that our
investigation on the influence of the selectivity of feedback is one of the first
that addresses this important aspect of learning in VC decision making.115
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3. Setup
One way to determine the performance of strategies would be to implement
what Brunswik (1955) called a representative design (see also Dhami et al.,
2004). In the present case this would require a randomly drawn set of real
business plans, all described on the same set of features and with information120
available about their performance in case these plans had found an investor and
had been realized. There are two reasons why we did not evaluate the decision
strategies this way. The first is pragmatic: To the best of our knowledge, such
a data set does not exist, nor is it likely to be collected and made accessible to
academic inquiry in the near future. The second reason is of a methodological125
nature: Even if the data existed and were at our disposal, simply observing how
the strategies fare in such a randomly sampled set of business plans would not
make it possible to conduct a systematic study of the dependency of strategies’
success on particular information structures.
In an attempt to overcome the difficulties associated with representative130
design, Hammond (1966) differentiated between the concepts of substantive sit-
uational sampling and formal situational sampling. The former implements the
original idea of representative design by focusing on the content of the task
and using real stimuli that have been representatively sampled from the en-
vironment. The latter, in contrast, permits the construction and presentation135
of stimuli that are representative in terms of the formal informational proper-
ties of the environment (i.e., number of cues, their values, distribution, inter-
correlations, and ecological validities). We followed Hammond’s approach and
created fictitious business plans that our simulated VCs used as input when
making their success forecasts and investment decisions. This procedure gave140
us perfect control over the statistical structure within ”‘our”’ world. It is impor-
tant to add that the statistical properties in this artificial world were informed
by the literature and our knowledge of the real world, that is, the generation of
business plans was based on a set of plausible assumptions that had an empirical
basis.145
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Each of the plans that we generated is associated with a set of k binary
cues Ci ∈ {000 . . . 0, . . . , c1c2c3 . . . ck, . . . , 111 . . . 1}, and a dichotomous (future)
outcome variable which can take the values +1 (success or positive return on
investment) and -1 (failure or negative return on investment). Each cue is prob-
abilistically related to this outcome so that the vector of cue values (henceforth,150
the cue profile) is useful information when it comes to predicting whether a
business plan will result in success or not. Note that the cues in the present
simulations are devoid of any semantics, that is, they could include variables
specified in the business plan (e.g., experience of the management team) or
variables describing the broader context (e.g., market characteristics).155
3.1. The Environments
The term ”environment” refers to the set of probabilities used when creating
a set of business plans. Specifically, an environment is characterized by the
following probabilities. Each of the possible cue profiles is associated with a
probability po(Ci) that it occurs, and with a probability ps(Ci) that it will be160
successful, so that knowledge of this set of probabilities is sufficient to determine
the probability of success (πs) for a randomly sampled business plan from this
environment.
3.1.1. Cue Weighting Structures
We were interested in the question whether the performance of deal selec-165
tion strategies depends on how cues differ from each other with respect to their
statistical relationships with the outcome variable. Therefore, we generated
environments in which the cues are equally important when determining out-
comes, and other environments in which some cues are more important than
others. Specifically, the outcome is determined by comparing a weighted sum170
of the cues and a random error component with a threshold value. In the Equal
Weights environments, all cues are weighed equally. In the Arithmetic Weights
environments, a constant value is added to cue weights for each subsequent
cue in a fixed sequence, whereas in the Geometric Weights environments, cue
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weights in the sequence are multiplied by a constant factor. Parameter values175
and details for generating these environments for different numbers of cues are
described in Appendix A.
3.1.2. Overall Success Probability
In our simulations, we created environments with a predetermined overall
success probability. Because the individual success probabilities of the various180
cue profiles are known (see Appendix A), it was possible to manipulate the
occurrence probabilities of the individual cue profiles such that the resulting
overall success probability matched the predetermined probability. The details
of this procedure are described in Appendix B.
3.2. The Decision Strategies185
Even experts have been shown to have major difficulties when engaging
in unaided judgmental forecasting (Dawes, 1979; Tetlock, 2005; Burgman et al.,
2011). In the present paper, we use simulated VCs who execute four well-defined
strategies to make these selections. Such a simulation approach removes any
noise that humans produce when using strategies unreliably, and hence allows190
us to determine the upper bound of aided decision making.
Each of the four deal selection strategies we consider in this paper is respon-
sive to experience and integrates new information in systematic ways. However,
the strategies differ with respect to how information about cue profiles is pro-
cessed and how their parameters are computed from a set of business plans for195
which the cue profiles and outcome information are given. Equal Weighting is
an algorithm that simply bases the decisions on the number of cue values in a
cue profile that point to success. Logistic Regression is a procedure to estimate
weights in a linear combination of cues, which, in turn, is used to make deci-
sions. CART (Breiman et al., 1984) is a tree-building algorithm that is flexible200
enough to produce the same decisions as any other possible strategy for binary
cues. The Fast and Frugal Tree heuristic (Martignon et al., 2003, 2008) is a
tree-building algorithm as well, but it is more restricted in the sense that the
8
set of trees it can possibly generate is reduced. Note that each of these strate-
gies needs to estimate parameters, which is achieved on the basis of a sample of205
cue profiles and their associated outcome values, henceforth referred to as the
learning sample L.
Equal Weighting combines the principle of unit weighting of cues, as instanti-
ated by Dawes’ Rule (see Dawes, 1979; Czerlinski et al., 1999; Hastie & Kameda,
2005) and index methods (see Burgess, 1939; Armstrong & Graefe, 2011) and210
the principle of making identical predictions for sets of objects with the same
number of positive cue values, as, for example, implemented in the Mapping
Model (von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008). Fast and Frugal Trees are simple bi-
nary decision trees that look up cue values sequentially and that are potentially,
depending on the cue value observed, able to make decisions without consulting215
further cues. They embody the principle of one-reason decision making and
have been analyzed and tested in the context of the simple heuristics program
Todd et al. (2012). Logistic regression and CART are procedures often used in
machine learning and classification tasks across disciplines.
Ordered with respect to complexity when estimating their parameters, Equal220
Weighting is the simplest strategy, followed by the Fast and Frugal Tree, with
Logistic Regression and CART being the most complex strategies of the set. The
details of their implementation in the present study are specified in Appendix C.
3.3. The Learning Task: The Standard Condition and Its Variations
3.3.1. The Standard Condition225
In this paper, we simulated a number of VCs over the period of one fund.
During the life of a fund, four VCs were confronted sequentially with 210 ran-
domly generated business plans. The four VCs differed with respect to which of
the four forecasting and deal selection strategies described above they used to
make their 210 investment decisions. A given condition, which was defined by230
a particular set of parameter combinations (described below), was realized 100
times, corresponding to 100 different sets of 210 randomly generated business
plans. Each of these different sets was shown to new VCs, so that none of the
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simulated VCs could use knowledge from a previous fund.
The following properties define what we refer to as the standard condition235
that we use as a reference point when presenting the results of the simulation:
Each VC started with an experience base of 26 business plans with known cue
profiles and outcome information, generated by the same process as the 210
plans for which the VCs had to make their investment decisions. When learning
its parameter values from the experience base before starting a new fund, each240
deal selection strategy used the same 26 plans. In the standard condition, each
business plan was characterized by eight cues and their values, and all this
information was given, without any cue reading errors, to the VCs. The plans
were randomly generated using the arithmetic cue weighting structure displayed
in Table 2 and an overall success probability πs = .2.245
For each of the 210 business plans in a given fund, the VC had to decide
whether or not to invest an arbitrarily chosen investment unit (the same for each
investment). After a feedback lag of 26 plans (reflecting the fact that feedback on
whether or not a business succeeds is usually delayed, Shepherd & Zacharakis,
2002), the business plan’s cue profile and its outcome was added to the VC’s250
experience base regardless of the investment decision. Each time a profile was
added to this experience base, all strategies estimated their parameters again
as described above and without any bias. An investment decision for any of
these plans led to a return of 150% of the investment unit if the business was
successful, and to its complete loss if it failed.1255
3.3.2. Variations
Taking the standard condition as a starting point, we manipulated a number
of parameters. In this paper we focus on three parameters that we considered
to be most interesting and for which we report the effects below: First, the
selectivity of the feedback relates to the question of whether feedback on the260






outcome variable was provided for all plans or only for those in which a VC
actually invested, resulting in a biased sample (compare Denrell, 2003). Second,
the cue weighting structure (as described in Table 2) determined how predictive
the cues were relative to each other (Zacharakis & Meyer, 2000). Third, the
number of cues specified how many pieces of information the strategies had at265
their disposal when making decisions (Zacharakis & Meyer, 1998).
In addition, we manipulated a number of other factors: Overall success
probability (Chrisman et al., 1989; Shepherd, 1999b), financial consequences of
success and failure (Bruno & Tyebjee, 1986; Gompers & Lerner, 2001), size of
the expertise base (Shepherd et al., 2003; Franke et al., 2008), delay of outcome270
feedback (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978; Harvey & Fischer, 2005), amount of error
in determining success (Khan, 1987; Zacharakis & Meyer, 1998). These manip-
ulations served as a sensitivity analysis and their effects were either minor or
intuitive. More importantly, these robustness checks revealed that our major
results seem not to hinge on specific parameter constellations, therefore specific275
results are not reported here.
4. Results
4.1. The Standard Condition
The main measure we use to evaluate the behavior and the monetary per-
formance of the strategies is the accumulated profit, that is, the total ROI after280
the first k investments. Note that the number of investments should not be
confused with the number of encountered plans. This difference is important as
the decision strategies differ with respect to how many investments were made
for a given number of presented plans, or, conversely, how many plans were
presented before making k investments. If the fund closed before k investments285
were made, then the profit for k investments was defined as the profit that had
accumulated at the time the fund closed.
Figure 1 displays the profit of the strategies after k investments, averaged
across the 100 simulated funds, for the parameter configuration that we defined
11









































Fast and Frugal Tree
Arithmetic Weights Environment
Figure 1: Return after k investments in the standard condition
The curves, except for the Fast and Frugal Tree, have similar shapes and
can be divided into four distinct phases. In the first phase, the learning phase,
profit gradually increased with the number of investments, reflecting the fact
that VCs refined their parameters and continued to benefit from a growing
experience base. In the second phase, the informed phase, the slope (i.e., the295
average difference with respect to accumulated return) remains relatively stable,
reflecting the fact that the parameter estimates no longer changed substantially
as new feedback was obtained (which amounts to saying that VCs were relatively
well informed about their environment). In the fourth phase, the slope finally
approaches zero, reflecting the fact that – by the time the fund was closed (i.e.,300
after 210 plans) – each VC had made a certain number of investments (mi) and
the VC’s profit is defined to be constant for any k > mi. In the intermediate
third phase, the slope smoothly decreases, reflecting the fact that the curve
12
for a given strategy is aggregated over 100 funds, each managed by a different
VC with a distinct mi. Had we used twice as many plans, the learning phase305
would have looked exactly the same, the informed phase would have lasted more
than twice as long (because there would be no necessity to start learning from
scratch), and the final profit would have been more than twice as high (because
the informed phase, during which profit is higher compared to the learning
phase, would have lasted more than twice as long).310
The Equal Weighting strategy had the shortest learning phase, ending at
approximately 15–20 investments, and the highest slope during the informed
phase. CART started negative while learning but was able to recover and to
make positive profits. Still, it was less profitable than Equal Weighting and
Logistic Regression, and it never reached their final level of profits. The Fast315
and Frugal Tree did not make any profit at any time.
Table 1 provides some additional information about the behavior and per-
formance of the strategies in the standard condition. The measures introduced
in this table correspond to the phases that we identified in Figure 1. The first
data column reports the average return per investment computed over the first320
25 investments (ROI1−25). If a VC made less than 25 investments, this VC’s
investments were still included in the analysis. As Figure 1 shows, some strate-
gies had a learning phase longer than 25 investments, but it also seems to be
the case that none of them had completed learning before this point. Equal
Weighting, which had the shortest learning phase, also made the most profit325
during this phase.
The second data column reports the return averaged across the 25 invest-
ments between the 51st and 75th (ROI51−75). As above, not every VC con-
tributed 25 data points to the analysis. As Figure 1 shows, this period falls
into the informed phase of Equal Weighting and the Regression strategy, while330
it seems to be at the very beginning of CART’s informed phase. Again, Equal
Weighting performed the best.
The next data column in Table 1 reports the average return across all in-
vestment decisions made by the VCs using a given strategy (ROIall). The next
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Table 1: Results for the Standard Condition.
Return on Investment Total Number of Investments Final Return
ROI1−25 ROI51−75 ROIall Minimum Maximum Mean SD Mean SD
Equal Weighting .20 .31 .27 62 149 92.9 17.3 25.4 7.2
Logistic Regression .09 .24 .21 113 203 157.7 17.9 32.9 8.4
CART -.03 .14 .11 108 197 147.1 18.1 16.1 10.1
Fast and Frugal Tree -.52 -.25 -.52 0 52 2.0 5.2 -1.0 2.4
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four data columns report how many investments the 100 simulated VCs who335
used a given strategy made across the 210 plans. First, the variance and the
range of this number (across the VCs who used the same strategy) were quite
large. Second, the difference between the strategies with respect to the mean
number of investments that VCs made was also considerable. The entries for
the minimal and maximal number of investments roughly mark when the slope340
during the informed phase starts to decrease and when it approaches zero, re-
spectively. Even though Equal Weighting had a higher slope during its informed
phase, VCs who used this strategy invested, on average, less than those using
Regression. As a consequence, the curves cross and Equal Weighting ended up
with a lower final return (see Table 1, last two columns).345
The performance of the strategies, as summarized in Figure 1 and Table 1,
can be related to the cue weighting structure. In the present environment with
its linear and compensatory set of weights (arithmetic cue weighting structure,
see Table 2), neither of the two tree algorithms was competitive. The Fast
and Frugal Tree did not find the single cue that is valid enough for one-reason350
decision making, simply because this cue did not exist. CART, in contrast,
has the potential to deal with an arithmetic cue weighting structure, but this
requires the construction of a complex tree with a high number of nodes, which,
in turn, requires an extended experience base. Note that at a given stage during
the construction of the tree, the business plans are distributed over its end nodes355
and a small sample of plans prevents these end nodes from being split up further.
Even though Equal Weighting does not match the weighting structure in the
present environment, its ability to make robust inferences Dawes (1979) was
able to compensate for this mismatch – at least to such an extent that it was
able to outperform the Logistic Regression.360
4.2. Selectivity of Feedback
In the standard condition, the VCs could include all business plans in their
experience base, no matter whether they had decided to invest or not to invest.
While it is of vital importance to monitor the success or failure of business plans
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a VC invested in, such information about plans that a VC rejected is often not365
available – be it because outcome information did not reach the VC after a
different investor funded the unmodified proposal, or because no other investor
has been found and the business hence failed to materialize (Bruno & Tyebjee,
1986). A high confidence in one’s ability to make good investment decisions,
eventually coupled with the belief that outcome information about rejected pro-370
posals is irrelevant, may lower the motivation to actively search for such (po-
tentially costly) information.
The biased sampling of business plans creates a situation in which the set of
plans that VCs encounter cannot be considered to be a representative sample
of the business plans in the population. The psychological literature is rich in375
examples demonstrating that performance is severely impaired due to such a
sample selection bias (see Brunswik, 1955; Fiedler, 2000; Dhami et al., 2004).
To see how this bias affects investment results, we also created a condition
in which the simulated VCs were only able to include in their learning sample
those business plans they invested in (note that this reduction of feedback was380
only implemented after the fund started, but it did not affect the experience
base that VCs were equipped with before they started to make decisions). The
results are displayed in Figure 2. As the comparison between this figure and that
of the standard condition shows, all strategies perform worse if the feedback was
selective – be it because the size of the learning sample was smaller, or because385
the learning sample was biased, or both.
Even though the order of the four strategies with respect to their profit was
the same for both learning conditions, there are some striking differences. The
strategy that was most affected by restricting the learning sample was CART: As
in the standard condition, the slope starts out negative, but when information390
on rejected business plans was lacking, this strategy was not able to enter an
informed phase in which the constructed trees could make substantial profits,
and, as a consequence, also not able to compensate for the losses made during
its learning phase.



































Fast and Frugal Tree
Learn from Investments only
Figure 2: Return after k investments while learning from investments only
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during its informed phase (see also Table 1, ROI51−75), when feedback was
selective this slope is reduced by roughly 20% to about .24. Note that slopes of
.3 and .24 correspond to 86.6% and 82.7% successful outcomes among business
plans that received funding, respectively, which should be compared to the a
priori success probability of .2. For Logistic Regression the slope was reduced400
from about .25 by roughly 28% to about .18, corresponding to 83.3% and 78.7%
of successful outcomes among all investment decisions. Thus, not only did
Equal Weighting have a higher slope than Logistic Regression in both feedback
conditions, it also suffered less when outcome information on rejected plans no
longer entered the learning sample; that is, it was more robust when sample405
selection bias was introduced. To put the absolute effect between unselected
and selected feedback received during the informed phase in context, note that
a drop in profits of .06 (Equal Weighting; from .3 to .24) and .07 (Logistic
Regression; from .25 to .18) is still more than 10% of the profit for a successful
deal, which was .5 investment units.410
The drop in performance due to selectivity of outcome feedback for three
of the four strategies can also be seen when considering ROIall. For Equal
Weighting, Logistic Regression, CART, and the Fast and Frugal Tree, (ROIall)
was .21, .16, .00 and -.44, respectively, when feedback was selective. Comparing
these values to the last column of Table 1 (where feedback was given for all415
plans), the drop in performance due to this manipulation was roughly .06, .05,
.11 for the first three strategies. The Fast and Frugal Tree improved by roughly
.08, while the ROIall stayed negative.
4.3. The Cue Weighting Structure
For the standard condition, we used arithmetic cue weights when generating420
business plans. As explained in the Setup section, we also generated business
plans for which the cues were equally predictive (equal weights), or for which
their weights adhered to a geometric distribution (see Table 2). We reran the
standard condition except that we used business plans generated with the arith-
metic and geometric cue weighting structure. The performance of the strategies425
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in the two new environments is shown in Figure 3. It is evident that the relative
success of the four strategies depends on the environment in which they are
tested.
In the Arithmetic Weights Environment, and especially in the Equal Weights
Environment, Equal Weighting was the best strategy (in terms of average return430
on investment during the informed phase). In the Geometric Weights Environ-
ment, Equal Weighting was the worst performing strategy, while in contrast, the
Fast and Frugal Tree, which had failed in the Equal Weights Environment, now
performed best, almost converging against the theoretically optimal slope of .5.
CART, which had shown the worst performance during the learning phase and435
the second worst performance during the informed phase in the other two envi-
ronments, showed virtually the same (good) performance as Logistic Regression
in the Geometric Weights Environment.
For the Equal Weighting strategy, the average number of investments did not
vary much between the environments (94.4, 92.9, and 82.7 for Equal Weights,440
Arithmetic Weights and Geometric Weights, respectively). In contrast, both for
the Logistic Regression (127.8, 157.7, and 181.6, respectively) and for CART
(126.0, 147.1, and 182.0), this number increased as the skewness of the dis-
tribution of cue weights increased (note that a higher skew made it easier to
identify what the predictive cues in the environment were). The difference was445
most pronounced for the Fast and Frugal Tree which made, on average, 2.5
investments in the Equal Weights Environment, 2.0 in the Arithmetic Weights
Environment, and 103.8 in the Geometric Weights Environment.
The cue weighting structure turns out to be a crucial factor in the study
of the ecological rationality of strategies: a strategy tended to perform well450
if its architecture matched the properties of the environment (here, the cue
weighting structure). Equal Weighting excelled in an environment in which
the cues were equally predictive, but in the Geometric Weights Environment
in which the distribution of cue weights is highly skewed, this strategy was
punished for using a non-matching weighting structure. Treating some cues455





























































































Figure 3: Return after k investments for the Equal Weights and the Geometric Weights Environment
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makes sense only if some cues are indeed more important than others in the
respective environment. Therefore, it showed the opposite pattern compared
to Equal Weighting. Martignon et al. (2008, Result 2) have shown that each
linear threshold model with non-compensatory weights shows the same decision460
behavior as a corresponding Fast and Frugal Tree using the same (or a subset
of the) cues used in the linear model. Therefore, the Fast and Frugal Tree can
match the Geometric Weights Environment as the latter can be described as a
linear threshold classifier with non-compensatory weights.
These two examples were extreme in the sense that the two strategies had465
an extreme architectural bias (Equal Weighting is biased towards flat weight-
ing, and the Fast and Frugal Tree is biased towards a steep hierarchy) and the
two environments had extreme properties (flat and highly skewed cue weighting
structures). How did the strategies perform in the Arithmetic Weights Envi-
ronment whose cue weighting structure was in between that of the other two470
environments (see Table 2)? Consistent with the title Dawes (1979) used for his
classic paper (“The Robust Beauty of Improper Linear Models in Decision Mak-
ing”), Equal Weighting was robust enough to fare well when the cue weights
followed an arithmetic structure – and more than this, it was even the best
performing strategy. In contrast, this cue weighting structure was not skewed475
enough to allow the Fast and Frugal Tree to realize its potential. As Table 1
shows, VCs using this strategy could not construct a tree that led to a substan-
tial number of investments and those few investments obtained, on average, a
negative return.
In contrast to Equal Weighting and the Fast and Frugal Tree, the other two480
strategies were, at least in principle, flexible enough to adjust to a wide range
of environmental properties. One could therefore argue that in the Geometric
Environment, CART should be able to match the performance of the simpler
Fast and Frugal Tree, since the structure of the tree constructed by the latter
strategy is within CART’s search space. However, this is not necessarily true485
as the larger size of CART’s search space requires a longer learning phase to
find the structure of this tree (and even with an unlimited learning phase this is
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not guaranteed). Given the parameters we used in our simulations, even though
CART’s performance came close to that of the Fast and Frugal Tree, it did not
reach it (the slope in the informed phase was about 7% lower). CART also has490
the potential to construct trees that match the performance of Equal Weighting.
As it turned out, however, it struggled in the Arithmetic Weights Environment
and even more so in the Equal Weights Environment. This can be explained
by the fact that the trees necessary to capture the cue weighting structures
of these environments need to be much larger than those for the Geometric495
Weights Environment – and even CART’s prolonged learning phase for those
two environments was not sufficient to construct a competitive complex tree.
In a similar vein, Logistic Regression had the potential to perform well in
all three environments. It owes its flexibility to the fact that it estimates cue
weights without any restrictions. Indeed, there is no environment in which VCs500
using this strategy are heavily outperformed. Nevertheless, there is not a single
environment that allows Logistic Regression to win the competition against all
three other strategies. The lack of a stronger bias towards a particular cue
weighting structure and the impact of sampling error during the learning phase
prevents the strategy from finding the cue weights that are optimal for the505
environment, and hence, from reaching the performance that could theoretically
be achieved.
4.4. The Number of Cues
In the standard condition, a business plan was described by 8 cue values.
We manipulated this number and set it to be either 6, 8 (standard), 10, or510
12. The manipulation of the number of cues did not result in a change of
the ordering of the strategies, except for the fact that CART’s performance
decreased (compared to that of the other strategies) as the number of cues
increased. Figure 4 shows how each of the four strategies was affected by this
manipulation.515
The Equal Weighting strategy performed almost the same in the four cue










× × × ×
×
×
× × × × ×
×
×














































































































rs rs rs rs rs rs rs rs rs



















Fast and Frugal Tree
Figure 4: Return after k investments for different numbers of cues
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increased. For Logistic Regression, in contrast, an interesting pattern can be
observed: during the learning phase, the VCs using this strategy made better
decisions when the number of cues was smaller, whereas this relationship was520
reversed when considering the informed phase. In addition to the resulting
crossing of the return curves, it can be observed that the learning phase was
longer and the number of investments was higher when more cues were available.
For CART, the curves do not cross and in each phase, this strategy both made
fewer investments and performed better when the number of cues was smaller.525
Finally, the inability of the Fast and Frugal Tree to cope with an Arithmetic
Weights Environment (that we described above for the standard condition) was
robust against this manipulation, except that performance was worse for smaller
numbers of cues.
These results again demonstrate how important it is to consider strategies530
and environments jointly (Todd et al., 2012). The performance of a strategy
can only be determined in a given environment and strategies’ performance
can be affected differentially by changes of environmental features. Whereas
the number of cues (almost) did not affect Equal Weighting and the Fast and
Frugal Tree, CART and Logistic Regression performed differently in the various535
cue number conditions. For CART, the effect of the number of cues is readily
explained: the strategy obviously found it easier to construct a well performing
tree when the number of cues (and, hence, the universe of possible trees) was
smaller. For Logistic Regression, it is easier to estimate the parameters when
the number of cues is smaller (hence the shorter learning phase for a smaller540
numbers of cues), but once the strategy is in the informed phase and estimates
are relatively stable, the strategy benefits if more information can be processed.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
One of our central simulation results was that the Equal Weighting strat-
egy was competitive with more complex investment decision strategies. This545
finding is consistent with a general pattern found across a wide range of tasks
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and domains: Under specific conditions, simple strategies can outperform com-
plex strategies, presumably not despite of their simplicity but because of it
(Martignon & Hoffrage, 2002). Specifically, their success when deciding upon
new business plans can largely be attributed to the robustness of their param-550
eter estimates (see also Dawes, 1979). Complex strategies have an advantage
when it comes to fitting known data. This was not the situation, however, in
the present set of simulations, neither is it a relevant condition for VCs who
will have to make investment decisions for new business plans outside the learn-
ing sample, in particular, if this learning sample is small. In such a situation,555
simple strategies that are adapted to the environmental structure will prevail.
For instance, when Armstrong & Graefe (2011) compared forecasting methods
in the context of the last 29 U.S. presidential elections, they found that an equal
weighting model based on 59 biographical variables of presidential candidates
(which they called ”index method”) outperformed – in cross-validation – Gallup560
polls, prediction markets, and three respectable econometric models. Moreover,
they found that a model based on this bio-index was competitive with seven
econometric models in forecasting voting shares (see also Graefe, this issue).
In a similar vein, Gigerenzer & Brighton (2009) showed for small learning
samples that a lexicographic decision strategy outperformed several more com-565
plex strategies in a wide range of conditions (see also Brighton & Gigerenzer,
this issue), von Helversen & Rieskamp (2008) demonstrated that a simple strat-
egy which used equal weighting of predictors outperformed multiple regression
in an estimation task, and DeMiguel et al. (2009) demonstrated that the simple
1/N heuristic that allocated wealth equally across N assets could not be consis-570
tently outperformed by any of the optimizing allocation model that they used as
benchmarks. Goldstein & Gigerenzer (2009) offer a more extensive evaluation
of simple forecasting strategies. They demonstrate the successful performance
of simple prediction rules in tasks as diverse as portfolio selection, the predic-
tion of future customer purchase activity and future high-value customers, the575
forecasting of tennis and soccer results, and the forensic practice of geographic
crime profiling.
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Our results are in line with these findings: The performance of the simple
Equal Weighting strategy was robust across environments in the sense that it
either outperformed the other strategies (in Arithmetic and Equal Weights En-580
vironments) or did not lag much behind the winner (in a Geometric Weights
Environment). VCs who do not know the statistical structure of the environ-
ment are thus well-advised to use this simple and robust strategy as a starting
point and may, after a substantial number of investments followed by outcome
information, consult and carefully evaluate the experience base to check whether585
the millions or billions they have at their disposal should better be invested by
adapting a different plan for making investment decisions.
Our findings are also consistent with the notion of ecological rationality
(Todd & Gigerenzer, 2007), and demonstrate how important it is to consider
strategies and environments jointly: (i) The performance of a strategy can only590
be determined within the context of a given environment and (ii) strategies’
performance can be differentially affected by changes of environmental features.
Building on these observations, VCs are well advised to learn more about their
environment. Different VCs are likely to operate in environments with different
statistical structures, in other words, there will be variance across time, regions,595
markets and fund sizes. While our simulations used parameter ranges that were
informed by the real world, VCs need to know which parameter constellation is
relevant for them in particular.
Consequently, VCs may gain a competitive advantage from systematically
studying their decision making context, for instance, by using the information600
stored in their archives, or, even better, by creating protocols that allow for
convenient forms of data analysis. In this learning process VCs should, however,
consider that learning from outcomes of their own investments alone may lead to
biased parameter estimates for the decision strategies, as our simulations have
shown – simply because the amount of decision making experience, and learning605
as a result of the same, by any VC is too limited to enable them to estimate cue
weights with enough precision to apply the model. The consideration of their
own investments should thus be complemented by securing other information
26
sources to obtain a more complete representation of the statistical properties of
their environment.610
While the vast majority of research on VC decision making has focused more
on the VCs’ assessment of specific cues, our focus was on the performance of
forecasting and deal selection strategies that differ with respect to how they
process cues. Similarly, Zacharakis & Meyer (2000) used two bootstrapping
models to predict the success of ventures and compared the performance of615
these models to that of actual VCs (see also Armstrong, 2001). Their first model
used cue weights that were fitted to data from an earlier study and their second
model weighted the cues equally. The authors found that the equally weighted
bootstrap model was clearly better at selecting successful ventures than both
the alternative model and the actual VCs. They conclude that bootstrap models620
are useful decision aids for VCs – a conclusion that we fully endorse (see also
Zacharakis & Meyer, 1998; Shepherd & Zacharakis, 2002).
Our Equal Weighting strategy outperformed more complex strategies in two
of the three types of environments we analyzed. Zacharakis and Meyer’s boot-
strap model with weights that have been fitted to earlier data corresponds to625
the Logistic Regression strategy in our simulation with regression weights that
have been fitted to the VC’s experience base. Thus, in both studies the Equal
Weighting strategy is more robust and hence more useful than the regression
model when it comes to forecasting the success of previously unseen business
plans. Similarly, Åstebro & Elhedhli (2006) found that a simple conjunctive630
model with separate counts for good and bad cues also turned out to be ex-
tremely successful when modeling experts’ forecasts of early-stage ventures’ per-
formance. They concluded that ”simple decision heuristics can perform well in
a natural and very difficult decision-making context” (p. 395).
In the real world, VCs may provide value-added activities to their portfolio635
companies that will enhance their performance (Sapienza et al., 1994; Cumming et al.,
2005). Also, during times of increased VC investment activity or in the case of an
exceptionally promising proposal, VCs are often forced to compete for the oppor-
tunity to invest in selected deals (Gompers & Lerner, 2001; Lockett & Wright,
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2001). While we have not explicitly considered these factors so far, our sim-640
ulations do allow for their inclusion. In the first instance, when evaluating a
deal a VC will be assessing the need for, as well as their ability to provide, any
necessary hands-on involvement or other value-added activities. As such, the
perceived potential for the VC to provide support for a deal beyond the financial
investment can be one of the cues that are evaluated by a VC. Secondly, the645
actions of another VC interested in a potential deal, either observed directly by
the focal VC or reported by the entrepreneur or a third party, can be one of the
cues that are used in our simulations.
The decision strategies we have studied are described in a way that will assist
future researchers further the scope of empirical testing in the VC setting. The650
literature to date has provided many valuable insights on the content and process
aspects of the core VC activities but has predominantly provided descriptive
accounts that offer limited input to the VC community. Our work builds upon
this body of research and evaluates the VC investment decision task through
a more prescriptive approach. Moreover, in our simulations the term VC may655
represent an individual VC or a team of VCs within a firm so we hope that our
findings will provide the basis for more successful investment decision strategies,
at both the individual and firm levels. Finally, we believe that this paper can
serve as a basis for more longitudinal research that focuses on the intersection of
the weighting of informational cues, the forecasting and decision making process,660
and VC performance and learning.
Extending beyond the VC context, our simulations are equally relevant to
angel investment networks, the managers of corporate venture funds and private
equity funds. Although each of these investors has their own unique preferences
and investment objectives, they all seek profitable deals and draw upon multiple665
informational cues when evaluating potential investment opportunities. Addi-
tionally, we believe that our results will inform others who engage in evaluation
and selection routines such as human resource professionals or any manager
responsible for selecting job candidates. Given the robustness of the pattern
obtained in our own simulation and in the related research discussed above, we670
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predict that simple strategies for forecasting and for decision making will prevail
in these domains as well.
Appendix A: The cue weighting structures
5.1. Eight cues
Whether a business plan with a given cue profile has a positive or negative





wjci,j + ǫ, (1)
where wi are cue weights as specified below and ǫ is a random variable (whose
values are drawn from a uniform distribution over [−e; e], where the parameter





1 , u(Ci) ≥ θ
−1 , u(Ci) < θ.
(2)
The probability for each cue profile to be associated with a positive outcome













j=1 wjci,j − e ≤ θ ≤
∑k
j=1 wjci,j + e
0 ,
∑k
j=1 wjci,j + e < θ
(3)
The weights wj in Equation 1 together with the threshold and error define the675
relative importance of cues. The ordered set of weights conforms to one of three
different types of sequences, namely, constant, arithmetic, and geometric. Given
that a constant sequence of weights corresponds to a set of equal weights, we will
henceforth use the following terminology for the three types of cue weighting
structures:680
1. Equal: The weights are all set to wi = 1.
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Table 2: Parameters for the Standard Condition.
w1 w2 w3 w4 w5 w6 w7 w8 θ e
Equal Weights 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4.9 1.25
Arithmetic Weights 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.3 4.9 1.4









2. Arithmetic: The weights are determined by wi = s − (i − 1)
2s−2
k−1 . The
parameter 1 < s < 2 determines the highest weight (s) and the lowest
weight (2− s).
3. Geometric: The weights are determined by wi = s1 · s
i−1
2 . The parameter685
s1 > 0 determines the largest weight, the parameter 0 < s2 < 1 determines
the ratio between subsequent weights.
5.2. Different numbers of cues
For different numbers of cues, the weights of the cues had to be adapted in
order to still be able to satisfy the constraints imposed by the cue weighting690
structure (for the Arithmetic Weights Environment wi = s− (i− 1)
2s−2
k−1 ). The
maximum and the minimum cue weight as well as the size of the error component
were kept constant, only the threshold was increased by one for every two cues
that were added. The resulting cue weighting structures are displayed in Table 3
(for the Arithmetic Weights Environment).695
Appendix B: Calculation of occurrence probabilities
The following procedure was used to determine occurrence probabilities for
cue profiles in a way that guaranteed the predetermined overall success prob-




, or C−πs) as a result of the comparison between its individual success700
probability ps(Ci) and the predetermined overall success probability, so that
C+πs = {Ci|ps(Ci) > πs}, C
0
πs
= {Ci|ps(Ci) = πs}, and C
−
πs
= {Ci|ps(Ci) < πs}.
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Table 3: Parameters for cue number variations (rounded to two decimal places).
w1 w2 w3 w4 w5 w6 w7 w8 w9 w10 w11 w12 θ e
6 cues 1.70 1.42 1.14 0.86 0.58 0.30 - - - - - - 3.9 1.4
8 cues 1.70 1.50 1.30 1.10 0.90 0.70 0.50 0.30 - - - - 4.9 1.4
10 cues 1.70 1.54 1.39 1.23 1.08 0.92 0.77 0.61 0.46 0.30 - - 5.9 1.4
12 cues 1.70 1.57 1.45 1.32 1.19 1.06 0.94 0.81 0.68 0.55 0.43 0.30 6.9 1.4
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Now, let nh = |C
+
πs
|, nl = |C
−
πs
| and n0 = |C
0
πs
|. We can then state
the average probability of success for profiles with probabilities above and be-















ps(Ci), respectively. The occurrence probabilities for cue





























ensuring that the overall success probability for a set of business plans with
these occurrence probabilities is at the predetermined level.
Appendix C: Implementation of Algorithms705
Implementation of Equal Weighting
Equal Weighting is based on the number of cues whose values predict success.
Specifically, the learning sample is first used to determine, for each cue, which
cue value, if any, is associated with a higher percentage of successful plans.
Equal Weighting then counts, for a given cue profile Ci, the number w(Ci) of710
cues whose values point to success. All observed cue profiles that share the
same w(Ci) are grouped into one class, for which it is determined whether it is
better to invest or not. This, of course, depends on the financial consequences of
investment decisions, specifically on the outcomes for successes after decisions
to invest (ois), failures after decisions to invest (oif ), successes after decisions715
not to invest (ons), and failures after decisions not to invest (onf ).
The fraction τ =
onf−oif
onf−oif+ois−ons
represents the relationship of the conse-
quences incurred by decisions concerning plans that fail and plans that succeed:
If a plan fails, the difference between not investing and investing into the plan is
onf − oif . If a plan succeeds, the difference between investing and not investing
is ois − ons. These differences reflect the financial impact of a correct versus
false decision for unsuccessful and successful plans, respectively. The fraction
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τ will have values between 0 and 1, with this value being close to 1 when the
impact of investment decisions (invest versus not invest) for successful plans is
negligible when compared to the corresponding impact for unsuccessful plans.
Conversely, the value of τ is close to 0 when the impact of investment decisions
for unsuccessful plans is negligible compared to the corresponding impact for
successful plans. A value of .5 represents a situation where the two impacts of
decisions for successful and unsuccessful plans are the same. In this situation, a
VC can gain as much from investing in a successful plan relative to not investing
as the VC can lose from investing in an unsuccessful plan relative to not invest-
ing. If Equal Weighting is used in this case, then it is sufficient to determine
the fraction of successful and unsuccessful business plans in memory within the
class defined by w(Ci) and follow the majority in the sense that an investment
is made, whenever the majority of plans within this class is successful. In the


















Whenever D(Ci) = 1, the decision is made to invest in Ci and one investment
unit is immediately invested. When D(Ci) = −1, the decision is made not to
invest in the business plan. Finally, when D(Ci) = 0, one of the two decisions
is selected randomly with equal probabilities. This procedure ensures that, at720
least for the set of cue profiles in L with identical value of w, the most profitable
decision (invest or not invest) is chosen if it exists (based on the assumption that
the business plans in memory are representative of the population, of course).
Implementation of Logistic Regression
The dependent variable is not directly regressed onto the predictors, rather725
the probability of being associated with a positive outcome value (pi) is esti-
mated for each profile. Because pi can only take values within the interval [0; 1],







take values in the interval ]−∞; +∞[. This log-odds-ratio is, in turn, regressed
onto the predictors in the form logit(pi) = β0 +
∑k
j=1 cjiβj .730
In this sense, a Logistic Regression involves nonetheless a linear combination
of predictor values. Unlike in OLS regression, the predictors are estimated via
a maximum likelihood estimation algorithm (see Agresti, 2002). In the present
simulation, Matlab’s “glmfit” procedure was used for this task. The probability
of success for a given business plan that is estimated by Logistic Regression
(p̂i) is then compared to the ratio of potential losses and gains, similar to the





1, p̂i > τ
−1, p̂i < τ
0, p̂i = τ
(6)
Again, the decision to invest or not to invest is based solely on D(Ci), following
the same procedure that is explained above for Equal Weighting.
Implementation of CART
CART (Breiman et al., 1984) is an algorithm to develop binary trees (i.e.,
trees in which each node has either two or zero child nodes) without a priori735
constraints pertaining to the tree structure. CART uses a binary recursive
partitioning algorithm for creating a binary decision-tree structure. The process
starts by creating the root node that contains the total set of business plans of
L. If and only if this number of plans is above a predefined threshold (in our
implementation, 10), two child nodes are created from this root node. Each740
of the (dichotomous) attributes that describe a plan can be used to assign a
plan to one of the child nodes. CART chooses the attribute that maximizes the
homogeneity of the resulting subgroups with respect to the outcome (technically,
this is achieved by minimizing the GINI’s diversity index). Each child node that
results from this process will, in turn, be used as a new parent node, and the745
procedure described above will be applied to it and to any further child nodes.
This procedure continues until no further splits are possible, which is the case
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if all end nodes either contain less than 10 cases, or contain business plans with
only one outcome. A given end node is associated with the decision (namely, to
invest or not) that maximizes the profit that results from applying this decision750
to all plans that are contained in this node. In our simulation, Matlab’s standard
“treefit” procedure was used to implement CART.
Implementation of Fast and Frugal Trees
Fast and frugal trees are a class of binary classification trees that are struc-
turally constrained in the following way (see Martignon et al., 2008, for a formal755
treatment of fast and frugal trees). Following the root node there is exactly one
end node at every level, except for the last level, which has two end nodes.
Therefore, a tree with m levels (including the root node) has 2m− 1 nodes. On
each level, exactly one cue is considered. Depending on the cue value, either
an end node is reached or information processing continues down the tree by760
looking up information on another cue. If the cue value leads to an end node,
then an investment decision is made, be it to invest or not to invest. Thus,
fast and frugal trees exemplify one-reason decision making. Moreover, it is a
non-compensatory strategy because once an end node is reached, no further
information is processed and the decision associated with this end node cannot765
be changed (see Martignon & Hoffrage, 2002).
In a simulation involving 30 empirical data sets, Martignon et al. (2008)
compared various algorithms to construct such fast and frugal trees. In the
present paper, a variant of the winner in their competition is used, henceforth
referred to as the Fast and Frugal Tree. Its structure is constrained such that the770
decisions associated with the end nodes on subsequent levels alternate between
investing and non-investing. Within this structure, cues are ordered according
to their usefulness to either correctly identify successful or unsuccessful business
plans – depending on whether the current level demands that an investment or
non-investment decision should be made. This structure helps to protect against775
all cases being classified in the same way. In some environments enforcing such
a balance may exact a price, specifically, if the base rate of successful plans
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is either very high or very low, or if the two misclassification costs are highly
dissimilar. To mitigate such disadvantages, the procedure described above is
modified as follows: If the base rates of successful and unsuccessful plans are780
unequal, then a bias is introduced that allows to have several end nodes of the
same type in sequence.2 In addition, the misclassification costs and the observed
diagnosticity of cue values determine which cues cannot be utilized as a basis
for positive and negative decisions.3 Even though this restriction can lead to
a pruned tree or, in a more extreme case, to the same default decision for all785
plans, they prohibit the use of cues that make a monetary loss highly probable
if decisions are based solely on a single cue value.
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